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Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of performance-based
layoffs on wage rigidity in the context of performance pay. In the model, it becomes
optimal for firms to raise future regular pay to maintain workers’ current efforts, which
results in downwardly rigid regular pay under the threat of performance-based layoffs.
Furthermore, it becomes optimal for firms to base wages less on workers’ performance
during recessions due to the lower value of productivity. Consequently, wages during
recessions also become “rigid” (inflexible) with respect to performance. The Japanese
panel dataset supported these theoretical implications.
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1 Introduction
When unemployed workers are available, firms do not cut wages until the excess supply
is eliminated, which is unexpected in the ideal market scenario depicted by the conven-
tional theory. This phenomenon has puzzled economists, and a number of studies have
attempted to understand it. Noteworthy among these studies is the work of Bewley (1999),
whose commendable field research provided a clue to the cause of the phenomenon. In
his research, Bewley (1999) found that no existing theories on wage rigidity correctly
explained his findings in the “real” U.S. labor market, which implied the need for a new
theoretical model.
Research on wage rigidity during a recession is important for many reasons, one of
which is that wages during a recession can help reduce high unemployment rates. The-
oretically, firms could hire more people by paying lower wages to existing workers,
and if wages are not decreased during a recession it may prevent new workers from
being hired. Thus, if there is a particular reason why wages are not decreased during
a recession, it would be worthwhile to understand the possible sources of such wage
rigidity.
In this study, I explore the mechanism by which nominal wages become downwardly
rigid during a recession (but not during a boom) by showing that firms have reason to
resist cutting nominal pay during a recession. I adopted a model in which firms decide
the intensity of performance-based layoffs based on market conditions. Consequently,
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in my model, layoffs occur only during recessions.1 By adopting this setting, unlike
the typical efficiency wage models such as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Sparks
(1986), wherein an equilibrium with no dismissal is derived, I was able to answer
the question: Why do wages not fall during recessions in which firms lay off many
workers?2
Recently, performance-based pay has been employed in many countries. For exam-
ple Lemieux et al. (2009) showed that, in the U.S., the proportion of performance-paid
jobs is increasing. Moreover, the “pay-for-performance” system has become widespread
in many countries since the 1990s. This is particularly so in Japan, where most employ-
ees traditionally receive a substantial portion of their pay in the form of bonuses. The
amount paid as a bonus generally fluctuates depending on the firm’s and the worker’s
performances. Thus, particularly for countries such as Japan, it is important to assume
performance-based pay rather than fixed wages. Given this scenario, the model presented
in this study divides a worker’s total compensation into two components: a fixed com-
ponent (regular pay) and a performance-based pay component (bonus). This division
makes it possible to determine how each component contributes to wage rigidity during a
recession.
According to Bewley (1999), the key reason for a firm’s reluctance to cut wages is the
belief that nominal wage cuts damage worker morale. This finding implies that, while
modeling nominal downward wage rigidity, it might be better to allow wages to posi-
tively affect worker performance. The model presented in this study allows interactions
between wages and workers’ efforts both over and within periods. Since a fixed compo-
nent and a performance-based pay component play different roles in inducing high levels
of effort in a multiple-period model setting, throughout this paper, the different ways that
the two components contribute to wage rigidity are explained.
The main results obtained from the theoretical model are as follows: (a) performance-
based layoffs are more likely to occur when the layoff costs and the output price are low;
(b) regular pay is likely to be downwardly rigid during periods in which performance-
based layoffs occur; and (c) bonuses move proportionally to the output price. The
rationale behind result (c) is as follows: During a recession, the lower value of productiv-
ity discourages firms from maintaining workers’ current incentives at high levels, which
results in lower bonuses during these periods. As a result, wages during recessions also
become “rigid” (inflexible) with respect to performance.
To test the theoretical implications obtained from the model, an empirical analysis is
conducted using Japanese panel data from the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS),
2004–2007. The empirical part consists of the following two steps: The first step is a
layoff regression, which is employed to confirm whether performance-based layoffs are
more likely to occur during a recession when the output price is low and for non-union
workers whose performance-based layoff costs are relatively low. The second step is
a wage regression. This step shows that regular pay becomes downwardly rigid when
performance-based layoffs are likely to occur, and that bonuses move proportionally to
the output price.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the framework of the basic
model. Section 3 presents an empirical strategy to test the implications of the theoreti-
cal model. Section 4 provides a brief description of the data, and Section 5 discusses the
results from the empirical analysis. Section 6 presents the conclusion.




Here, Baily (1977)’s two-period layoff model setting in which layoffs can occur only at the
beginning of the second period is adopted. This timing of layoffs divides all periods into
two: the period before the timing of the layoff is Period 1, and the period after the timing
of the layoff is Period 2. In Section 3, an extended model in which the contract is renewed
once the two-period frame is finished is presented.
2.1.1 Output price
As assumed in Baily (1977), the firm is a price-taker, and the output price in Period 1 is
known to everyone, while the output price in Period 2 is not known in Period 1 and is
therefore given as a random variable. The output price for Period 2 is drawn randomly
from a distribution, G(p), with a density function of g(p) > 0 for p ∈ [p−, p+] and is
assumed to be i.i.d.3
2.1.2 Wages
A worker’s wage in each period i (= 1, 2) is divided into two components; namely, a
fixed pay component and a performance-based pay component. The components for each
period are expressed as follows:
w1(p1) = a1(p1) + b1(p1) e1 (1)
w2(p2) = a2(p2) + b2(p2) e2 (2)
where a represents regular (fixed) pay and b represents the “piece rate” paid for each unit
of effort, e. Both a and b are assumed contingent on the output price, pt (t = 1, 2).4
2.1.3 Layoffs
Here, it is assumed that the firm can decide whether to implement layoffs at the beginning
of Period 2, and if a layoff is implemented, it will be a performance-based layoff in which
the probability of a worker being laid off is a decreasing function of the effort offered by
the same worker in the previous period. As is assumed for wages, the layoff decision is
also contingent on the output price. Since the layoff can be implemented at the beginning
of Period 2, the layoff decision depends on p2.
When the intensity of layoffs given p2 is defined as γ(p2), the probability of a worker





+ (1 − γ(p2)) · 1 (3)
It is assumed that e is given exogenously, while γ is chosen by the firm for each realization
of p2.5 Note that a higher value of γ means a worker faces a greater risk of being laid off
and that γ = 0 means no layoffs, regardless of the level of the efforts provided in Period 1.
2.1.4 Timing
The timing of events is as follows:
1. The output price, p1, is observed by every unit in the model.
2. The firm offers a contingent labor contract to potential workers (applicants).
3. Applicants decide whether to accept or reject the firm’s offer. If accept, workers
exert effort; therefore, production occurs, profits are realized, and payments are
made at the end of Period 1.
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4. The output price, p2 is realized. At the beginning of Period 2, in the case of γ > 0,
workers are laid off with a probability of γ(p2) (1 − e1/e). If not laid off, workers
who have already worked for one period at the firm and decide to stay in the same
firm, enter Period 2.
5. Workers in Period 2 exert effort; therefore, production occurs, profits are realized,
and payments are made at the end of Period 2.
6. Workers who have finished their second period at the firm will retire.
2.2 Workers
It is assumed that all workers are identical in skill levels and utility functions. It is also
assumed that a worker’s utility is increasing in wage,w, and decreasing in the level of work
effort, e. Therefore, the posited utility function is:
Utility = w − 12e
2 (4)
Let VE be the discounted expected lifetime utility for a new worker. Assuming that a
worker is paid wages at the end of a period, VE is given by:






γ(p) · min ( e1e , 1)+ 1 − γ(p))×
max
{
a2(p) + b2(p)e2 − 12e22, U
}
+γ(p) (1 − min ( e1e , 1))U
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ dG(p) (5)
where U is the unemployment insurance benefit for one period, which is exogenously
given.6 Workers who have completed the first period are allowed to quit the firm if the
utility for the second period, calculated based on the output price p2, is lower than U .
Given the contract proposed by the firm, each employed worker decides howmuch effort
to invest in his/her current job to maximize his/her expected lifetime utility.7 For γ to
capture the intensity of performance-based layoffs, it is assumed that the exogenous vari-
able e is large enough to ensure that the internal solution for e∗1 is always less than e, which
results in e∗1/e < 1. Then, solving the first-order conditions, the effort supply functions
can be written as:














e∗2 = b2 (7)
Eq. (6) and (7) show that workers’ current levels of effort depend on the current piece
rate, b; in other words, e∗1 and e∗2 increase in b1 and b2 respectively.8 However, it is more
important to note that, as long as a firm pays wages that are higher than those necessary
to keep workers during the second period, the effort of a new employee, e1, will also be
affected by the wages scheduled to be paid in the next period after performance-based
layoffs have occurred (i.e., γ(p) > 0); that is, in deciding on an optimal level of effort,
workers in Period 1 consider the future wage they will receive during periods in which
performance-based layoffs occur. This is because, given the possibility of being laid off,
workers in Period 1 will receive wages in the second period only if they work hard in the
first period and avoid being laid off. Then, higher contingent wages paid in Period 2, in
which layoffs occur, encourage workers in Period 1 to work harder.
In contrast, the contingent wages of workers in Period 2, in which layoffs do not occur
(i.e., wages with γ(p) = 0), do not affect the efforts of workers in Period 1. This is because
workers in Period 1 will necessarily receive the wages without being laid off, regardless of
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their current levels of effort. Thus, when γ(p) = 0, only the current piece rate can affect
the incentives of workers in Period 1. For example, if layoffs occur only in a recession,
wages scheduled to be paid during a recession will affect the levels of effort in Period 1,
while wages scheduled to be paid during booms will not.
2.3 Firms
Let C be the exogenous costs associated with laying off a worker. The expected profits
from hiring a worker at period t can be written as:






γ(p) e1e + 1 − γ(p)
)
× (p2e2 − a2(p) − b2(p)e2)
−Cγ(p) (1 − e1e )
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ dG(p) (8)
The firm offers a new employee a contingent contract X = (a1(p1) , b1(p1) , γ(p2) ,
a2(p2) , b2(p2) ;∀p2) to maximize profit subject to providing the worker with a competi-






a2(p2) + b2(p2) e2 − 12e22 ≥ U ∀ p2
e∗1 = e(b1, γ , e, a2, b2,U , δ)
e∗2 = e(b2)
γ(p2) ≥ 0 ∀ p2
γ(p2) ≤ 1 ∀ p2
(9)
Let λ1(p2) ≥ 0 and λ2(p2) ≥ 0 ∀ p2 be the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with
the participation constraints for a worker in Periods 1 and 2 respectively. μ1(p2) ≥ 0
and μ2(p2) ≥ 0 ∀ p2 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with γ(p2) ≥ 0 and
γ(p2) ≤ 1 ∀ p2 respectively. Then, the first-order conditions can be solved as follows:
∂L
∂a1
= −1 + λ1 = 0 (10)
∂L
∂b1

















e + 1 − γ(p2)
)
g(p2)











e + 1 − γ(p2)
)(









e + 1 − γ(p2)
)(




































+ μ1(p2) − μ2(p2) = 0 ∀ p2 (14)
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From Eq. (10), we get:
λ1 = 1 (15)
This result means VE = VU (i.e., the firm guarantees utility just necessary to employ the




By substituting Eq. (15) and Eq. (16) into Eq. (12), we have:
λ2(p2) = 0 ∀ p2 (17)
This means that the no-quit constraint for workers in Period 2 is not binding. Thus, as
long as the firm solves the optimization problem presented in Eq. (9), the no-quit con-
straint is automatically satisfied, and workers will never quit, even without the no-quit
constraint.
Proposition 1. Workers in Period 2 are always paid higher wages than they would
otherwise earn because of the outside option. In other words, the following participation
constraint is always satisfied:
a2(p2) + b2(p2) e2 − 12e
2
2 > U ∀ p2 (18)
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that a firm paid just the necessary level of wages to
keep workers during the second period. Then, the firm might be better off increasing
b2(p2) by a small amount and decreasing a2(p2) by an amount so that these changes still
satisfy a2(p2) + b2(p2) e2 − 12e22 = U . This is because, if the firm paid just the necessary
amount to keep workers during the second period, future wages should not affect the
incentives for workers in Period 1 due to Eq. (6). Therefore, decreasing a2(p2) would not
affect efforts of workers in Period 1 but would allow the firm to increase b2, which would
enable the firm to induce greater efforts from workers in Period 2. In contrast, when the
firm pays more than the necessary amount to prevent workers from quitting, decreasing
a2(p2) from the optimal level derived in this section will lower the level of workers’ efforts
in Period 1, which would result in a decrease in profits. Thus, the firm does not have an
incentive to deviate from the optimal solutions.
The intuition for this result is that, as long as the firm pays a positive amount of wages
in the second period, it is more beneficial for the firm to give workers a positive surplus
that will affect their efforts in Period 1, as well. Thus, the firm pays more than necessary
to keep workers during Period 2 to induce higher effort levels from workers in Period 1.
Proposition 2. Bonuses move proportionally to the output price.
Proof of Proposition 2. From the first-order conditions for b2, we obtain p2 = e∗2.
From Eq. (7), we also know that e∗2 = b∗2(p2). Combining these two equations yields:
b∗2(p2) = p2 ∀ p2 (19)
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Eq. (19) implies that the piece rate is set equal to the output price in Period 2. Thus,
in equilibrium, the marginal revenue of effort from the viewpoint of a firm (p2), the









are set to be equal. Eq. (19) also implies that firms base their wages less
on workers’ performance during recessions. This is because during recessions, firms are
discouraged from maintaining workers’ incentives at high levels due to the low value of
productivity.
Proposition 3. Layoffs occur when p22/2 − U + C < 0 is satisfied. This implies that
layoffs are more likely to occur when layoff costs C and the output price p2 are low.
Proof of Proposition 3. Substituting Eq. (15), Eq. (16), e∗2 = b∗2(p2), and Eq. (19) into







p22/2 − U + C
)
g(p2) + μ1(p2) − μ2(p2) = 0 ∀ p2 (20)
Since (e1/e − 1) in the first term in Eq. (20) is always negative by assumption, the sign of{
μ1(p2) μ2(p2)
}




< 0 if p22/2 − U + C < 0
= 0 if p22/2 − U + C = 0
> 0 if p22/2 − U + C > 0
(21)
Note that these two multipliers cannot be positive at the same time, since γ(p2) = 0
and γ(p2) = 1 cannot hold at the same time. Since both μ1(p2) and μ2(p2) are always




can be negative only when μ1(p2) = 0 and
μ2(p2) > 0. This corresponds to the case of γ ∗(p2) = 1; that is, the case in which the




} = 0, can be true only when μ1(p2) = μ2(p2) = 0
holds. In this case, γ ∗ (p2) can take any number between 0 and 1 when p2 satisfies the
condition p22/2 − U + C = 0 as an equality. With continuous p2, this happens with zero




> 0 can be satisfied only when μ1(p2) > 0
and μ2(p2) = 0 correspond to the case of γ ∗ (p2) = 0; that is, the case of no layoffs.




= 1 if p22/2 − U + C < 0
∈ [0, 1] if p22/2 − U + C = 0
= 0 if p22/2 − U + C > 0
(22)
Thus, the case of γ ∗(p2) = 1 is more likely to occur when p and C are low and U is high.
That is, the firm’s optimal layoff decision can be explained as follows: when the output
price is high enough to satisfy p2 >
√
2(U − C), γ ∗ (p2) = 0 holds; that is, no workers
will be laid off. This is consistent with the findings of Bewley (1999), who showed that the
majority of layoffs are implemented in response to reduced demand for labor because of a
decline in product demand. The other result, which shows that higher layoff costs reduce
the probability of layoffs, is intuitive and needs no explanation.
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The next proposition explains how the optimal regular pay is related to the layoff
decision stated in Proposition 3.
Proposition 4. In periods where layoffs occur, the regular pay has a higher lower-bound
than the regular pay in periods in which layoffs do not occur.
Proof of Proposition 4. If we substitute Eq. (19) and e∗2 = p2 into Eq. (18), Eq. (18)
becomes:
a2(p2) > U − 12p
2
2 (23)
We know from Eq. (22) that U − p22/2 > C holds when γ ∗(p2) = 1; thus, we can derive
the following condition:
a2(p2) > C ∀p2 s.t. p2 <
√
2(U − C) (24)
Therefore, the lower-bound of C exists for the regular pay in Period 2 when the output
price of the second period is low enough for layoffs to occur. In contrast, for p2 that satis-
fies p2 >
√
2(U − C), a2(p2) can be lower than C because the right-hand side of Eq. (23)
is lower than C from Eq. (22).
Proposition 4 offers an implication for wage rigidity. Future wages scheduled to be paid
in the next period during which layoffs do not occur will not affect the current efforts
of workers in Period 1. This is because the workers will necessarily receive the wages
without being laid off in the next period, regardless of their effort levels in Period 1. Thus,
the firm cannot control workers’ efforts in Period 1 by their future wages scheduled to
be paid in booms, which results in lower, or at least less downwardly rigid, regular pay
during booms.
In contrast, future wages scheduled to be paid in the next period during which layoffs
occur affect efforts of workers in Period 1, since the workers will receive the wages only
when they work hard in Period 1 and avoid being laid off. Thus, the higher the wages
scheduled to be paid in regressions, the harder the workers will work. This gives the firm
an incentive to pay high regular pay in periods during which layoffs occur. As a result,
the regular pay of workers in Period 2 has a lower-bound, equal to the layoff costs when
the output price is low enough that layoffs occur, while the regular pay can be below the
layoff costs when the output price is high enough that layoffs do not occur. In this way,
the downward wage rigidity in this model during recessions occurs through a channel
wherein a low output price increases the probability of (performance-based) layoffs.
As confirmed in Proposition 1, if the firm must pay wages in the second period anyway,
it is more beneficial for the firm to pay wages such that they affect the workers’ efforts in
Period 1, as well. Thus, the firm offers a surplus, paying high regular pay for periods in
which layoffs occur and high bonuses for periods in which layoffs do not occur, due to the
high value of productivity.
Proposition 5. Except for cases where the output price greatly declines from Period 1 to
Period 2, workers’ pay becomes more performance-based as their careers progress.
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Proof of Proposition 5. Given Eq. (15) and Eq. (19), Eq. (16) can be rewritten as:
∂VE
∂e1




γ (p)1e (−a2(p) + C)
)
dG(p) = 0 (25)
As shown in Eq. (22), γ ∗(p2) = 1 holds for any p2 that satisfies p2 < √2(U − C), and
γ ∗(p2) = 0 holds for any p2 that satisfies p2 > √2(U − C). Therefore, the inside of the
integral in Eq. (25) becomes zero for the realizations of p2 >
√
2(U − C), and the second
term in Eq. (25) remains only for the case in which p2 <
√
2(U − C):






e (−a2(p) + C)
)
dG(p) = 0 (26)
Then, the conditional mean of the regular pay in Period 2, conditional on p2 <√
















2(U − C)) + C (27)
The first term in Eq. (27) shows that, to maintain the efforts of workers in Period 1, the
lower the piece rate of workers in Period 1, the higher the regular pay of workers in Period
2 should be. From Eq. (24), we know that a2 for the realizations of p2 that satisfies p2 <√
2(U − C) is set greater than C; thus, its conditional mean should also be greater than C.
Therefore, the first term in Eq. (27) should be positive, yielding the following inequality:
b∗1 < p1. (28)
Proposition 5 implies that, the closer a worker’s career is to its end, the less the incentive
devices to induce high efforts, because workers will face less risk of future layoffs after
passing many moments of layoff decisions. In the last period of the contract, what might
work as an incentive device will only be the current piece rate, which results in a higher
piece rate in Period 2. As a result, the piece rate paid to workers in Period 1 is set below
the output price, while the piece rate paid to workers in Period 2 is set equal to the output
price. Thus, if workers encounter the same output price between periods Period 1 and
Period 2, they necessarily experience an increase in the piece rate as their careers progress.
Except for the case in which the output price greatly declines from Period 1 to 2, workers
experience a piece-rate increase as their careers progress.9
3 Contract renewal
Thus far, a two-period setting in which workers cannot stay in the firm for more than two
periods has been assumed. In this section, this assumption will be relaxed by introduction
of contract renewals.
The firm is assumed to have no information pertaining to the subsequent periods and
therefore cannot decide on future contracts, i.e., it cannot offer a contract beyond Period
2. Under this setting, the firmmaximizes its expected profit every two periods and renews
the contract every two periods. By contrast, workers can live for multiple periods.
After the two-period contract expires, given a new contract proposed by a firm, workers
initially hired at period t choose their optimal effort level again. Let VE∗(t+2) be the maxi-
mized lifetime expected utility after the contract is renewed at period t + 2; in addition,
workers do not perceive that their present decisions on the level of effort affect VE∗(t+2),
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so VE∗(t+2) is taken as given in this model. The subscript variable, t, t + 1, or t + 2, within
parentheses represents the period over the multiple-period horizon, whereas the sub-
script numbers 1, 2 represent the first and second periods, respectively, within the same
contract period.
Similarly, the lifetime expected utility for a person unemployed in period t can be
written as:
VU(t) = U + δ
(
fVEo(t+1) + (1 − f )VU(t+1)
)
(29)
where f is the probability that an unemployed person finds a job. Collecting the unem-
ployment insurance benefit for one period, U , the unemployed moves into employment
with probability f ; otherwise, the individual remains unemployed. I assume that in decid-
ing the effort level, a worker believes that the contracts of other firms remain unaffected
by changes in his/her own firm’s contract, i.e., the worker has Nash perceptions. To incor-
porate this idea, here, I distinguish between VE(t), the lifetime utility of a worker currently
employed in a particular firm, and VEo(t) , the lifetime utility he/she could obtain by working
in other firms.
As in the previous section, a worker’s problem can be written as:







γ(p) · min ( e1e , 1)+ 1 − γ(p))×
max
{
a2(p) + b2(p)e2 − 12e22 + δVE∗(t+2), VU(t+1)
}




With the first-order conditions solved, the effort supply functions can then be written as:







a2(p) + b2(p)e2 − 12e
2





e∗2 = b2 (32)
Given these supply functions and a worker’s participation constraints, the firm offers a
new employee a contingent contract X = (a1(p1) , b1(p1) , γ (p2) , a2(p2) , b2(p2) ;∀p2) to






a2(p) + b2(p)e2 − 12e22 + δVE∗(t+2) ≥ VU(t+1) ∀ p2
e∗1 = e
(
b1, γ , e, a2, b2,VE∗(t+2),VU(t+1), δ
)
e∗2 = e(b2)
γ(p2) ≥ 0 ∀ p2
γ(p2) ≤ 1 ∀ p2
(33)
Note that the only modification that will be made to the first-order condition is the
first-order condition with respect to γ . As in the previous section, with the first-order
condition with respect to a1, we obtain λ1 = 1. With this result, the following equation
holds again:
VE(t) = VU(t) (34)
Then, the worker becomes aware of the relation between VE(t) and VU(t), which is proposed
by the firm for a new contract, and expects that the same relation will be realized after
Yokoyama IZA Journal of Labor Economics 2014, 3:6 Page 11 of 23
http://www.izajole.com/content/3/1/6
period t. Indeed, provided a firm keeps maximizing its profits subject to the same con-
straints over time, the lifetime expected utility after being re-contracted is set equal to
that of unemployment after the expiry of the two-period contract.
When we consider the fact that the above equation will also be realized for new con-
tracts in future periods and repeat substitution over the multiple periods, VU can be
calculated. Then, regardless of how p varies, estimating VE and VU for each economic
unit in future periods will be possible: Making use of Eq. (34), we can rewrite Eq. (29) as:
VU(t) = U + δVU(t+1) (35)
If the number of periods goes to infinity, VU will be converged to:
VU = U1 − δ (36)
Then, using Eq. (34) to Eq. (36), we obtain the following equation:
δVE∗(t+2) − VU(t+1) =
δU
1 − δ −
U
1 − δ = −U . (37)
The only twomodificationsmade in this section appear in the first-order condition with
respect to γ and the effort supply function for Period 1, so these two changes become
redundant in the infinite period case. Note that in a finite case, although the expression
of U will be changed, the main predictions about a2, b2, γ in the previous section do not
change.
Thus, even if we consider the contract renewal explained above, the same results can be
derived, and this assures that whether we guarantee a long period for each period or not
does not matter in the model. How to map the theoretical model to the real data will be
addressed in Section 5.
4 Empirical model
This section presents an empirical strategy used to test the implications of the theoretical
model. There are two steps in the evaluation. The first step is layoff regression, which
tested the implications of Proposition 3. The second step is wage regression, which tested
the implications of Propositions 2 and 4.
4.1 Layoff regression
Proposition 3 states that layoffs occur when inequality p22/2−U +C < 0 is satisfied. This
implies that layoffs are more likely to occur when the performance-based layoff costs C
and the output price p are low. Thus, the following model is estimated:
Layoffit = η0 + η1NonUnionit + η2 Priceit + Xitη + uit (38)
where Layoffit is an indicator function that equals 1 if individual i is laid off in year t.
Non-Unionit is a dummy variable that is 1 if the individual is a non-union worker at the
beginning of year t, and Priceit represents the output price faced by the firm where indi-
vidual i worked at the beginning of year t. Xit represents the attributes of individual i and
his/her firm at the beginning of year t.
The union status captures the magnitude of performance-based layoff costs C because
these costs for unionized workers are expected to be higher than for non-union workers
due to contract provisions.10
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The expected sign for η1 is positive because non-union workers are expected to have a
higher probability of being laid off than are unionized workers due to their lower layoff
costs. The expected sign for η2 is negative because layoffs are less likely to occur when the
output price is high.
4.2 Wage regressions
Next, a regular-pay regression is introduced to test Proposition 4, which states that the
contingent regular pay becomes downwardly rigid during periods where performance-
based layoffs occur. Together with Proposition 3, which states that performance-based
layoffs are likely to occur during recessions, Proposition 4 has implications for the
downward rigidity of regular pay during a recession.
To empirically test the theoretical implications, a finding of Bewley (1999) that 57% of
non-union workers are laid off based on performance, while only 7% of union workers are
laid off based on performance, is utilized. This finding means that the model setting that
assumes performance-based layoffs is more applicable to non-union workers.
Thus, in the regular-pay regression, the interaction term between the “non-union
worker” dummy variable and the output price is included. Including this term reveals how
the coefficient of Price is different between non-union workers and unionized workers;
more specifically, whether counter-cyclical movement of regular pay is more likely for
non-union workers whose layoffs are more likely based on performance.
In contrast, Proposition 2 predicts that the bonus is proportional to the output price.
Therefore, whether the coefficient of the output price is significantly positive is examined
in the bonus-pay regression. The estimated model is:
{
lnait = α0 + α1NonUnionit + α2Priceit + α3NonUnionit · Priceit + Xitα + uit
lnbit = β0 + β1NonUnionit + β2Priceit + β3NonUnionit · Priceit + Xitβ + eit (39)
where lnait and lnbit are the logarithms of regular pay and bonus pay for individual i in
year t respectively.
Proposition 4 predicts that α3 is significantly negative because regular pay is expected
to be more counter-cyclical for non-union workers. In contrast, the sign of β2 implied by
Proposition 2 is significantly positive.11
Since the dependent variables in the wage regressions (regular pay and bonuses) are
reported only by working people, there might be a selection bias. If there is a tendency
for workers with specific unobserved characteristics to avoid layoffs during a recession,
Priceit and the error term might be correlated. For example, if workers with very high
ability are less likely to be laid off during a recession, then a lower output price would
make it more likely that workers included in the sample would have high ability.12 Since
such unobservable individual characteristics might be included in the error term, Priceit
is thought to be correlated with the error term. Then, the coefficients α2 and β2 could be
negatively biased in the OLS. Furthermore, it is thought that this selection bias is more
serious for non-union workers, since their employment is assumed less protected than
that of unionized workers. This means that α3 and β3 might also be biased if we use OLS.
Therefore, it is necessary to use the panel data to control for workers’ fixed effects. It
is expected that this research problem will be resolved by introducing the fixed-effects
model.
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5 Data
This study used Japanese panel data from the KHPS, which is conducted annually by Keio
University. The KHPS data are relatively new, as data collection for the survey began in
2004. This survey is conducted in January every year and includes observations randomly
chosen from almost all regions and industries in Japan. A key feature of the KHPS is
that it is the first nationwide follow-up survey in Japan for individuals (4,000 households
and 7,000 people) of all ages and both sexes that also captures information on educa-
tion, employment, income, expenses, health, and family structure. The survey is designed
to enable comparisons with major international panel surveys, such as the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)
survey.
The details of the KHPS data used are as follows. Respondents for the first wave are
men and women aged 20–69 as of January 31, 2004, from across Japan. The first wave
(2004) included 4,005 households; the second wave (2005) included 3,314 of the 4,005
households in the first wave; the third wave (2006) included 2,887 households; and the
fourth wave (2007) included 2,643. The attrition rate from the first to the fourth waves is
34%.
Industry-level CPIs from the consumer price index data by the Statistics Bureau at the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications (2006)) are used as the measure of the output price. Table 1
shows the changes in annual CPI for each industry during the period 2003–2006. To avoid
a potential mismatch between the CPI data and the industry categories used in the survey,
the service industry and the “financing and insurance” industry are excluded from the
sample. In addition, because in many cases the outputs of the mining industries are used
as intermediate goods traded between firms, the price index data in the Corporate Goods
Price Index are used for the mining industry (Bank of Japan 2006).
To assure that the CPI is also a good indicator of the business cycle, analyses will also
be done using the gross-output deflator from Cabinet Office (2006) for a proxy of p in the
model. The change in the gross-output deflator is reported in Table 2; overall, the changes
are similar to that of the CPIs in Table 1.
Table 1 Changes in CPI by industry
Industry\Year 2003 2004 2005 2006
Agriculture 99.6 103.2 100.0 102.0
Communications 108.6 107.3 100.0 96.4
Construction 100.6 100.3 100.0 100.3
Electricity, Gas, Heat Supply, and Water 99.1 99.2 100.0 103.6
Fishery and Forestry 99.6 103.2 100.0 102.0
Manufacturing 100.2 100.3 100.0 100.6
Mining 99.5 99.6 100.0 101.0
Real Estate 100.3 100.1 100.0 100.0
Transport 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.6
Wholesale and Retail Trade 100.2 100.3 100.0 100.6
Note: The base year for CPI is 2005, and the CPI for 2005 is fixed at 100 for each industry. The CPI data was obtained from the
consumer price index data by the Statistics Bureau at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Statistics Bureau,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2006). To avoid a potential mismatch between the CPI data and the
industry categories used in the survey, the service industry and the “financing and insurance” industries were excluded from
the sample. The price index for the mining industry was obtained from the price index data in the Corporate Goods Price
Index (Bank of Japan 2006).
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Table 2 Changes in gross-output deflator by industry
Industry\Year 2003 2004 2005 2006
Agriculture 98.9 103.7 100.0 101.2
Communications 100.2 100.0 100.0 100.3
Construction 100.2 100.0 100.0 100.3
Electricity, Gas, Heat Supply, and Water 102.0 101.6 100.0 102.1
Fishery and Forestry 98.9 103.7 100.0 101.2
Manufacturing 96.7 98.0 100.0 102.4
Mining 96.9 98.1 100.0 102.7
Real Estate 102.2 100.9 100.0 99.2
Transport 100.2 100.0 100.0 100.3
Wholesale and Retail Trade 99.0 99.6 100.0 101.1
Note: The base year for the deflator is 2005, and the deflator for 2005 is fixed at 100 for each industry. The annual
gross-output deflator data is obtained from Cabinet Office (2006).
Table 3 presents a decomposition of the standard deviation of the two proxies for the
output price into across-individual and within-individual components for the sample of
the wage regression. During 2003–2006, the Japanese economy recovered from the reces-
sion that began in 2002, and in response to the trend, the increase in the proxy variables
over the period can be observed for almost all of the industries. The gross-output deflator
shows that one of the most notably affected industries by the economic recovery is man-
ufacturing. Almost 50% of the sample is taken from the manufacturing industry; thus, the
time-series variation in the proxy variable, particularly the variation in the gross-output
deflator, is thought to be large enough, even within this short period. Therefore, the main
analyses includes results with both of the measures.
Table 4 contains descriptive statistics for the sample of layoff regression. The samples
included only individuals who are working as of January in year t. Those represented in
the first column are divided into two groups: 1) those who left/changed employers dur-
ing the year t (shown in the second column) and 2) those who continued with the same
employer (shown in the third column). The layoff regression determined how the employ-
ment status and the output price at the beginning of year t affected the layoff probability
during year t. Thus, Table 4 reports the characteristics of the workers (and employers) at
the beginning of year t and the industry-level consumer price index during January. For a
robustness check, the gross-output deflator is also used for the proxy of p, but monthly- or
quarterly-base data is not available for each industry for the gross-output deflator. Instead,
the annual deflator reported in Table 2 is used in the layoff regression. Because the survey
asked about a change in employer during the previous year, information on a job change
Table 3 Variance decomposition
Proxy variables for p Mean Decomposition Std. Dev.
100.48 Overall 1.58
Consumer Price Index (CPI) Between 1.30
Within 1.13
99.61 Overall 1.64
Gross-Output Deflator Between 1.26
Within 1.31
Note: The sample is that used in the wage regression. The mean value of each proxy variable of p (i.e., CPI and the
gross-output deflator) and its standard error decomposed into between and within components are reported.
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample of layoff regression
Left employer No change
All during year t in employer
CPI by Industry 1.002 1.001 1.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Output Deflator by Industry 1.001 1.001 1.001
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Age 46.042 41.716 46.247
(11.630) (11.703) (11.588)
Tenure 14.016 6.242 14.385
(11.941) (9.090) (11.935)
Number of Children 1.471 1.411 1.474
(1.094) (1.133) (1.092)
Firm Size 186.358 151.284 188.025
(203.191) (179.084) (204.135)
Male 0.686 0.629 0.689
(0.464) (0.484) (0.463)
Married 0.852 0.731 0.858
(0.355) (0.445) (0.349)
Non-unionized Worker 0.598 0.782 0.589
(0.490) (0.414) (0.492)
Change/Left Employer during Year 0.045 1.000 0.000
(0.208) (0.000) (0.000)
Laid-off 0.003 0.061 0.000
(0.053) (0.240) (0.000)
Junior High School 0.113 0.086 0.114
(0.316) (0.282) (0.318)
High School 0.556 0.594 0.554
(0.497) (0.492) (0.497)
Junior College 0.107 0.127 0.106
(0.309) (0.334) (0.307)
University 0.225 0.193 0.227
(0.418) (0.396) (0.419)
Observations 4342 197 4145
Note: Column 1 contains the descriptive statistics for individuals who were working as of January in year t. Those
represented in Column 1 are divided into two groups: 1) those who left/changed employers during year t (Column 2) and 2)
those who continued with the same employer (Column 3). “Laid off” is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the individual
was laid off during year t. CPI is the industry-level consumer price index during January of each year. The CPI for January
2005 was fixed at 100 for each industry. Since the gross-output deflator is not available on the monthly level, the annual
gross-output deflator by industry is used in the analyses.
during year t could be obtained from the survey of year t + 1. In contrast, the character-
istics of the workers (and the employers) at the beginning of year t are obtained from the
survey of year t. To utilize both, the sample is restricted to individuals who participated
in the survey for at least two consecutive years. The average age of the participants is 46.0
years, and 59.8% of the sample did not belong to any labor union. Individuals who left or
changed their previous employers during year t comprised 5% of the sample, and 6.1% of
these were laid off.
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of wage regressions. In these
regressions, observations are restricted to individuals who earned positive values of reg-
ular pay and bonuses. Furthermore, note that in the theoretical model, the firm pays a
relatively high regular pay during recessions because workers can receive the wage only
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample of wage regression
All Non-unionized worker Unionized worker
Regular Pay 3796.26 3720.28 3898.05
(100 yen≈1 USD/month) (1769.03) (2065.88) (1260.85)
Bonus 12131.50 11308.87 13233.59
(100 yen≈1 USD/year) (9608.84) (10826.91) (7547.51)
CPI/100 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Output Deflator/100 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age 48.37 49.49 46.87
(8.70) (8.58) (8.64)
Tenure 22.75 22.28 23.38
(9.23) (9.37) (9.01)
Number of Children 1.65 1.57 1.75
(1.01) (1.04) (0.96)
Firm Size 312.06 236.36 413.48
(197.52) (200.80) (139.01)
Male 0.86 0.82 0.91
(0.35) (0.38) (0.28)
Married 0.93 0.92 0.95
(0.25) (0.27) (0.22)
Non-unionized Worker 0.57 1.00 0.00
(0.49) (0.00) (0.00)
Junior High School 0.08 0.10 0.06
(0.28) (0.30) (0.23)
High School 0.54 0.46 0.64
(0.50) (0.50) (0.48)
Junior College 0.08 0.09 0.07
(0.28) (0.29) (0.25)
University 0.28 0.33 0.21
(0.45) (0.47) (0.41)
Graduate School 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.10) (0.08) (0.13)
Observations 1832 1049 783
Note: Observations were restricted to those who earned positive values of regular pay and bonuses. Results for workers who
have worked longer than the median tenure defined for each industry×occupation category are reported to exclude the
wages of newly hired workers. CPI is the annual industry-level consumer price index in Table 1. The gross-output deflator is
used as the other measure of p, and its annual industry-level values are reported in Table 2.
when they avoid layoffs by working very hard in the previous period. Thus, in this situ-
ation, increasing workers’ future wages scheduled to be paid during recessions will give
workers an incentive to work hard, and this also becomes the firm’s optimal strategy. In
that sense, in testing the theoretical prediction on wage rigidity during recessions, the
wages that workers can receive without any effort (e.g., starting regular pay) should be
excluded from the wages to be analyzed because increasing such a wage does not moti-
vate workers, and no wage rigidity arises. Thus, the empirical results for workers who
have worked longer than the median tenure defined for each industry×occupation cate-
gory are reported to exclude the wages of newly hired workers. This manner of calculating
the median tenure reflects the fact that one period can be short or long depending on job
types.
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The total annual bonus payment amounted to three times the employee’s regular
monthly pay. From this data, it is confirmed that most employed workers in Japan receive
a substantial portion of their pay in the form of bonuses. This is consistent with the find-
ings of previous studies that used other earning data.13 The amount paid as bonuses gen-
erally fluctuates depending on the firm’s and the worker’s performance, which, together
with its substantial amount, suggests the importance of assuming performance-based pay
rather than fixed wages, particularly for countries such as Japan.
A comparison of descriptive statistics between non-union and unionized workers
shows that there is a systematic deference in the characteristics of the two groups. This
implies that there should also be a difference in unobservable characteristics, which could
be another reason for the differences in wage cyclicality. Thus, it is expected that not only
the observable characteristics, but also time-invariant unobservable characteristics, are
controlled by employing the fixed-effect model.
6 Empirical results
6.1 Layoff regression results
Table 6 presents the regression results of the layoff equation. The dependent variable is
an indicator function whose value is 1 if the individual was laid off during year t. Individ-
uals who are working at the beginning of year t are used for the sample. In this regression,
layoff experience during year t is regressed on the industrial-level CPI during January, the
non-union status dummy variable, and other worker characteristics at the beginning of
the year. For columns 3 and 4, instead of CPI, the gross-output deflator is used for the
proxy of p. The other worker characteristics include the male dummy variable, the edu-
cation dummy variable, potential experience in years (=age−6−education years) and its
square, tenure and its square, the marital status dummy variable, the number of children,
the logarithm of the firm size, regional dummy variables, industry dummy variables, and
occupation dummy variables.
The estimates in Table 6 show that the effect of p on layoff experience is signifi-
cantly negative in all columns. In other words, the data showed that layoffs are more
likely to occur during periods wherein the output price is low, which is consistent with
Proposition 3.
In contrast, almost all the columns suggested the significantly positive effect of the
non-union worker dummy on layoff experience. This is also consistent with the predic-
tion from Proposition 3, which stated that performance-based layoffs are more likely to
occur when the costs of performance-based layoffs are low. Thus, it is expected that the
theoretical predictions concerning performance-based layoffs are true in the actual data.
6.2 Wage regression results
In the wage regressions, the same explanatory variables as in the layoff regression are
used with two exceptions. First, the interaction between non-union status and a proxy of
p in the wage regressions is included. Second, the CPI used in the wage regressions is the
annual CPI (by industry) rather than the CPI during January used in Table 6.
Columns 1–4 in Table 7 report the results of the regular-pay regression. As discussed
in Section 4, the OLS estimates could suffer from a sample selection bias. Thus, the FE
estimates (and not the OLS estimates) should be considered the more reliable results. The
FE estimates indicate that the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly negative,
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Table 6 Layoff regression (probit)
Dependent variable: layoff==1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Proxy of p: p= CPI p=Output
p/100 -0.1265 -0.1182 -0.0268 -0.0230
(0.0632) (0.0669) (0.0122) (0.0098)
Non-union Worker 0.0016 0.0011 0.0021 0.0014
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0007)
Male 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004)
High School -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0016 -0.0010
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Junior College -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0007
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
University -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0010
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Experience -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Experience2/100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Tenure -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tenure2/100 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Married -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0013
(0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0016)
Number of Children -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
ln(Firm Size) -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Regional Dummies No Yes No Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.138 0.235 0.123 0.217
Observations 4342 3164 4342 3164
Note: Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean are reported. Standard errors clustered at industry levels are in
parentheses under the regression coefficients. All explanatory variables, except for the gross-output deflators, represent
information reported at the beginning of year t. The reference group for the education dummy variables is “Junior High
School.” CPI is the industry-level consumer price index during January of each year.
which supports Proposition 4. In other words, the regular pay of workers in Period 2 is less
responsive to changes in the output price for non-union workers. This result implies the
wage rigidity of non-union workers, whose layoffs are more likely based on performance.
However, with only the results in Column 2 it cannot be known whether the results in
Column 2 were obtained because of the downward wage rigidity during recessions. In
other words, it could also be obtained because of the upward wage rigidity during booms.
To exclude the possibility of the latter rigidity, the sample in Column 3 is restricted to
individuals in industries facing a decline in the CPI in each year, thereby allowing a focus
on the downward wage rigidity during recessions. With this new sample, the magnitude
of the coefficient of the interaction term became much larger and remained significantly
negative; this implies that the significantly negative coefficient of the interaction term in
Column 2 came from the downward wage rigidity during recessions, as expected.
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Table 7Wage regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Regular pay Bonus pay
OLS FE OLS FE
Proxy of p: CPI Output CPI Output
p/100 -0.792 0.503 1.806 0.560 -2.349 0.515 1.593
(0.303) (0.115) (0.207) (0.253) (0.494) (0.244) (0.581)
Non-union -0.573 0.507 2.023 0.305 -2.878 -0.879 -0.392
(0.499) (0.241) (0.357) (0.172) (0.991) (0.182) (0.704)
(p/100)×Non-union 0.553 -0.547 -2.043 -0.348 2.755 0.826 0.339
(0.497) (0.226) (0.341) (0.154) (0.969) (0.155) (0.700)
Male 0.620 – – – 1.003 – –
(0.030) – – – (0.063) – –
High School 0.056 – – – 0.230 – –
(0.047) – – – (0.068) – –
Junior College 0.111 – – – 0.258 – –
(0.069) – – – (0.068) – –
University 0.126 – – – 0.297 – –
(0.056) – – – (0.026) – –
Graduate School 0.262 – – – 0.479 – –
(0.059) – – – (0.325) – –
Experience 0.021 0.097 0.099 0.089 0.020 0.169 0.144
(0.006) (0.020) (0.049) (0.023) (0.029) (0.017) (0.027)
Experience2/100 -0.051 -0.168 -0.113 -0.164 -0.081 -0.269 -0.267
(0.009) (0.038) (0.095) (0.038) (0.046) (0.040) (0.036)
Tenure 0.045 0.040 0.000 0.046 0.072 0.024 0.032
(0.008) (0.042) (0.094) (0.044) (0.028) (0.101) (0.101)
Tenure2/100 -0.058 -0.040 -0.082 -0.052 -0.067 0.062 0.058
(0.011) (0.069) (0.186) (0.067) (0.045) (0.213) (0.205)
Married 0.055 -0.001 -0.044 -0.001 0.042 0.234 0.221
(0.049) (0.033) (0.075) (0.031) (0.105) (0.282) (0.282)
Number of Children 0.014 -0.013 0.048 -0.014 0.011 -0.018 -0.014
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.037) (0.059) (0.059)
ln(Firm Size) 0.021 -0.004 -0.020 -0.004 0.131 0.060 0.057
(0.008) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.029) (0.022) (0.023)
Test for Downward Rigidity No No Yes∗ No No No No
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.558 0.081 0.120 0.081 0.498 0.042 0.043
Observations 1832 1832 963 1832 1832 1832 1832
Note: *The sample in Column 3 is restricted to individuals in industries facing a decline in the CPI in each year. Standard
errors clustered at industry levels are in parentheses under the regression coefficients. The reference group for the
education dummy variables is “Junior High School.” CPI is the annual industry-level consumer price index reported in
Table 1. The gross-output deflator is the annual industry-level output deflator reported in Table 2.
Column 4 reports results using the gross-output deflators instead of the CPIs, and the
result again shows a significantly negative coefficient for the interaction term.
Columns 5–7 in Table 7 present the results of the bonus-pay regression. Although
the OLS estimates suggested negative coefficients for CPI, the CPI coefficient could
be negatively biased in the OLS regression because of the sample selection problem as
stated in Section 4. Indeed, if the FE method is employed, the effect of CPI on bonuses
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became significantly positive. Changing the price index to the gross-output deflator also
returned stronger results. Thus, the results of the bonus regression are consistent with
Proposition 2: the bonuses of workers in Period 2 moved in proportion to the output price.
These results from the wage regressions are consistent with Freeman and Weitzman
(1987), who found that Japanese bonuses are far more procyclical than Japanese base
wages.14
7 Conclusion
This study presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of performance-
based layoffs on wage rigidity in the context of performance pay. Given the findings of
Bewley (1999) that performance-based layoffs frequently occur during a recession, espe-
cially for non-union workers, a theoretical model in which firms can decide the intensity
of performance-based layoffs is constructed.
The firm’s behavior guaranteeing a positive surplus, works as an incentive for workers
in the first period to work hard, which is the same as the “penalty” in the usual shirk-
ing theory. However, in this paper the layoff decision has been endogenized and layoffs
can occur only during recessions. Then, when we consider a contingent pay, the positive
surplus is scheduled to be paid only during periods in which layoffs occur, i.e., reces-
sions, which yields the downward rigidity of regular pay during recessions. In contrast,
the performance-based component of pay, i.e., bonus, is important to induce a high effort
level fromworkers in the current period, which implies a high bonus during booms. These
results show that the two different components of pay contribute to wage rigidity in a
different way.
The empirical analysis in this paper used Japanese panel data from the KHPS. All
empirical results confirmed the theoretical implications.
This explanation for wage rigidity is particularly applicable for non-union workers
whose layoff decisions are more likely performance-based and for countries such as Japan,
where performance-based pay has been widely employed.
Endnotes
1In most economic models, firms lay workers off randomly or based on seniority. For
example, Baily (1977) and Macleod et al. (1994) presented models wherein firms lay off
workers randomly, while Grossman (1983) and Reagan (1992) assumed seniority-based
layoffs. Nosal (1990), Strand (1991) and Strand (1992) considered both types of layoffs.
Laing (1994) and Gibbons and Katz (1991) proposed signaling models wherein firms
may choose to lay off workers according to their observed abilities. Ioannides and
Pissarides (1983) presented a model in which a firm decides to lay off a worker based on
information about an external offer to the worker.
2In Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the dismissal rule is given exogenously, and workers
caught shirking are fired, regardless of market conditions. Sparks (1986) further
developed the rule of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) by making workers’ levels of effort and
the criterion for dismissal endogenous. In Spark’s model, it is assumed that workers who
provide effort equal to or above the minimum standard are never dismissed, and a firm
offers workers a labor contract that specifies wages and the required minimum effort
standard. In equilibrium, workers’ efforts are set equal to the minimum effort standard.
This yields no dismissals, regardless of market conditions, as Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)
demonstrated.
3Thus, a higher value of p1 does not lead the firm (or others) to expect a higher value
of p2.
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4Note that, because the firm can observe workers’ performance and thus base wages
on performance, the motivation for using the threat of layoffs as an incentive tool is
different from the typical efficiency wage model. In this model, the reason for using the
threat of layoffs does not stem from imperfect monitoring, but should instead be
understood as the firm’s strategy when both incentive tools – threat of
performance-based layoffs and performance-based pay – are available.
5It is assumed that e takes a sufficiently large number (so that the probability of a
worker being retained in the firm can be very close to zero when γ (p) = 1), but it takes a
finite number, so that the level e1 does matter in the layoff decision.
6In this study, it was assumed that all workers had the same abilities and skills; thus,
there was no room for the sort of inference that arises in the “career-concern” models, in
which a worker’s outside option in the second period depends on the market’s estimate
of the worker’s ability. Therefore, U does not depend on the level of effort in the first
period, as it usually does in “career-concern” models.
7Note that the worker never has an incentive to supply an effort beyond e, because
this would bring about disutility without decreasing the probability of being laid off.
8Since workers in Period 2 are assumed to retire after the second period, only the
current “piece rate” induces effort from workers in Period 2, as there is no threat of
future layoffs. Eq. (7) explains this result.
9Simple calculations using the first-order condition for b1 show that b1 would become
equal to p1 if the possibility of performance-based layoffs were eliminated, that is, if
γ = 0 was satisfied with probability 1. If this were to happen, the firm would not have to
differentiate b1 from b2, since both piece rates would affect only workers’ current efforts
without the possibility of layoffs. In this way, when there is no possibility of
performance-based layoffs, the two periods become independent of one another, and
then the two-period problem becomes a per-period profit-maximization problem.
10The survey conducted by Abraham and Medoff (1984) showed that, in the U.S.,
approximately 78% of union groups are covered by written policies that specified
seniority as the most important factor for consideration in permanent layoff decisions,
while only 16% of non-union groups are covered by similar policies. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) data also revealed that in 1970–1971, over 70% of employee
groups under major union agreements in the U.S. were covered by layoff provisions that
specified seniority as the most important factor for consideration in permanent layoff
decisions. Given this evidence, in the empirical analysis, the union status as a proxy for
layoff costs, C is used.
11To use bonuses as the performance-based component of wages, it is necessary to
ensure that bonuses are actually paid based on workers’ current performance. This is
supported by Freeman and Weitzman (1987), Ohashi (1989), and Brunello (1991), all of
whom examined the Japanese bonus system. Freeman and Weitzman (1987) stated that
compensating workers for their efforts is one of the main purposes of the bonus
payment in Japan. Ohashi (1989) also found that bonuses are paid to compensate
employees for the intensity of their work. Brunello (1991) found no statistically
significant correlation between bonuses and employment levels in the automotive, steel,
and electric-machinery industries in Japan, which implied that the profit-sharing aspect
of the Japanese bonus system is not substantial. In particular, since the 1990s, the
importance of the “pay-for-performance” aspect of the Japanese bonus system has
increased. Thus, an assumption of performance pay for Japan (w(e) = a + be) is more
valid theoretically than that of fixed pay (w).
12This type of selection bias is the so-called counter-cyclical composition bias,
although the term is usually used in the context of aggregate time-series data (Stockman
(1983), Bils (1985), Solon et al. (1994), and Chang (2000)).
13It is well known that the ratio of bonuses-to-total-pay is traditionally higher in Japan
than in other countries. Nakamura and Hubler (1998) showed that the ratios of bonuses
to regular pay in the 1980s are 0.317, 0.121, and 0.194 for Japan, Germany, and the U.S.,
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respectively. According to Nakamura and Nakamura (1991) and Steinberg and Nakane
(2011), most employed workers in Japan are paid 25–33% of their total earnings in the
form of bonus payments.
14Freeman and Weitzman (1987) also found that base wages in Japan are negatively
related to employment. The results obtained from Table 7 are also consistent with this
finding because base wages in this study became downwardly rigid when employment
shrunk as a result of layoffs. Consequently, this implied a negative relationship between
base wages and employment. Moreover, Freeman and Weitzman (1987) found that
bonuses are positively related to employment. Note that, in this study, it is assumed that
bonuses are paid according to workers’ levels of effort. As a result, they are set equal to
the output price. Thus, although the model assumed the pay-for-performance bonus
model, the results did not refute the positive correlation between the amount paid in
bonuses and the firms’ profits (or other variables that reflected the firms’ profits, such as
employment). Therefore, the findings here did not contradict those of Freeman and
Weitzman (1987), who also analyzed the Japanese labor market.
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